The Stoics' four categories: τá τá τá τá ρòς τι (Tennemann).
|Unity —||plurality —||totality
Reality; negation; limitation
Inherence and substance; causality and dependence; interaction.
Possibility, impossibility — being, non-being; necessity, chance.
According to quality: affirmative, negative, infinite.
According to quantity: singular, particular, general.
According to relation: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive.
According to modality: assertive, problematic, apodictic.
According to quality: of individuality, of particularity, of universality
Quantity: of totality, analogy, induction.
Relation: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive.
Darwin, Zoonomie, überstzt v. Brandis. Baroque as well as original or primitive thoughts are found in this book.
Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie. Two volumes of this work have been published in many parts. Part two of volume two contains Leibniz and Idealism before Kant.
In Gottscheden's translation of Leibniz, Theodicee (1763 edition, Hannover and Leipzig), in a note on p. 80 about Malebranche's theory of passivity, there is mention of a work by a Professor Gabriel Fischer: Vernünftige Gedanken von der Natur; was sie sey? dass sie ohne Gott und seine allweise Beschräkung unmächtig sey; und wie die einige untheilbare göttliche Kraft in und durch ihre Mittelursachen nach dem Maasse ihrer verliehenen Virkbarkeit oder Tüchtigkeit, hier in der Welt alles wirke. 1743, no city or publisher. The book was confiscated, he says 9p.81].
In Gottscheden's translation of Leibniz's Theodicee (1763 ed.), p.81, there is mention of a work by a Jesuit, Thomas Bonartes, De concordia scientiae cum fide.
The Jesuit Friedrich Spee (the one who has written Cautio criminalis) has also written in German a work on the Christian virtues and argues the power of God's love to forgive sins even without the sacraments and the intervention of the Christian Church. See Leibniz, Theodicee, 1, para. 96.
Franciscus v. Sales, De amore Dei.
Cardanus, De utilitate ex adversis capienda
Novarinus, De occultis Dei beneficiis.
Quoted in L., para. 215
Theagenes and Chariklea, a romance by Heliodor, Bishop of Larissa, which is mentioned in Gottscheden's translation of Leibniz's work on King, De origine mali (1763 edition); he refers to Huetius, De l'Origine des Romans. There are two German translations, an old one without date and city, a new one by the Protestant pastor, M. Agricola, in the Jena of Mannsfeld, 1750.
Descartes (in his essay, De passionibus) observes correctly that admiratio has no opposite (see Article LIII). Similarly, that cupiditas ought not have its opposite in aversio but ought to have no opposite (see Article LXXXVII). This is important for my theory of anxiety. See JJ, page 3 from back [i.e., III A 233].
See Aristotle's Ethics, II, 5.
Aristotle distinguishes three aspects of the soul: πáθη, δυνáμεις, εζεις. (Garve translates the last one as "skills," chapter 5 in Aristotle. Chapter 4 in book II).
One can better understand the Aristotelian statement about voluntary action if one remembers that an important distinction is made between Τò εκoúσιoν and πρoαíρεσις (purpose), in such a way that something can be voluntary without being intended. (See Bk. III, ch. 4.)
In Book III, chapter 7, Aristotle rejects Socrates' and Plato's idealistic thesis that all sin is ignorance, but he does not remove the difficulty, for he merely ends in a realistic contradiction. This problem is of utmost importance and could very well lend itself to a monograph.
In margin: See Aristotle Ethics 7, 3.
The identity of virtue and beauty is also seen by Aristotle (3:10):
With respect to the concept of poetry it would be good to point out how Aristotle distinguishes and defines art. See 6,4.
In the last chapter of Book X of his Ethics Aristotle deals with the relation of ethics to politics, as he also begins ηθικá μεγáλα, saying that ethics is part of politics. Moreover, it is noteworthy that his own dialectic almost annuls this comment, since, indeed, the reflective life is the highest and the inferior happiness lies in the practice of the political virtues. (See 10, 8). But the contemplative life is isolation.
In this Leibniz is most certainly right over against Bayle, that by making man the sole measure of all things one gets entangled in contradictions. Bayle, like many others, has given the elemental impression that man has received the distinguished appointment in life to judge everything et quidem in relation to this position of man in creation. Leibniz shows that everything is linked together; he establishes a teleology which includes mankind. See para. 119 in Theodicy.
One cannot deny that there is a weakness in all the answers Leibniz gives Bayle in paragraphs 121, 22 and following; he seeks to avoid difficulty by saying that it is not a question of the individual man but of the whole universe. This is ridiculous, for if there is just one individual man who has valid reason to complain, then the universe* does not help. The answer is that even in sin man is greater, more fortunate, than if it had not appeared, for even the split in man has more significance than immediate innocence.
*In margin: He finally takes recourse in analogies from the external world, that God lets it rain, even though low-lying areas are not served thereby. See para. 134.
Epicurus has already abolished the principle of contradiction: his dispute with Chrysippus. See Leibniz's Theodicee, para., 169. The dispute between Diodorus and Chrysippus. Diodorus maintained that what had not existed and would not exist was impossible; Chrysippus denied it and maintained that it was possible, para. 170.
Leibniz's comments on King's book, para. 4. Even though the matter is altered as much as possible, these qualities still remain: extension, motion, divisibility, resistance.
The distinction that Bonaventura, following certain Church Fathers, makes between and conscientia. See Tennemann, Geschichte der Philos., VIII, pt. 2, p. 532.
Abelard has written a work [entitled] De praedicamentis. See Tennemann, VIII, pt. 1, p. 186.
Also Leibniz in his German letter to Wagner, the only German in Erdmann's edition.
Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, III.
Up to. p. 120 I have underlined in my copy everything that was striking.
The whole inquiry into πρωτη φιλοσοφíα, the ambiguity in it; at times it is ontology, at times theology. This confusion seems to me to be repeated in modern philosophy. See p. 67.[*]
In his classification all things are
perishable imperishable God
Where is there a place for man?
He does not classify dichotomously as Plato does:
He has a trichotomy:
There are four kinds of causes (see p. 120). Matter, form and prototype, effecting cause, Endzweck.
P. 121. Luck and chance.
[*] In margin:
In Berlin Schelling maintained that logic ought to be πρωτη φιλοσοφíα.
See my manuscript.
The transition from possibility to actuality is a change — thus Tennemann translates ; if this is correct, this sentence is of utmost importance (see p. 127).
is difficult to define, because it belongs neither to possibility nor to actuality, is more than possibility and less than actuality (see p. 128).
Continuation and decay are not .
There are three kinds of :
with respect to quantity
with respect to quality or accidental characteristics
with respect to place
All this deserves attention with respect to movements in logic.
Concerning Sextus Empiricus's doubt about criteria of truth.
The first criterion he introduces is man — and here he promptly awakens doubt about what it is to be a man. Socrates is supposed to have said that he does not know whether he is a man or a still more changeable animal than Typhon (see Plato's Phaedrus).
It was most discerning of S.E. to use the statement, only like recognizes like, to awaken skepticism (see Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, V, pp. 308- 309). The Christian statement, I know to the same degree as I am known, is also of great significance here.
What is the universally human, and is there anything universally human?
Is every man an individual, and in the sense that there is not another one like him, like Leibniz's leaves.
Are all men like unto each other as the parts of gold.
Hegel has never done justice to the category of transition. It would be significant to compare it with the Aristotelian teaching about .
see Tennemann III, p. 125; he translates the word as change.
What is implied in Antisthenes' position that nothing can be defined by what it is and any attempt at such a definition is a tautology. Only the characteristics of things can be stated. Aristotle opposed this.
See Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 235. Also II, p. 97
Can there be a transition from quantitative qualification to a qualitative one without a leap? And does not the whole of life rest in that?
Every qualification for which being [Væren] is an essential qualification lies outside of immanental thought, consequently outside of logic.
What is the historical significance of the category? What is a category?
Addition: Shall the category be derived from thought or from being?
Lectures on the Greek Sophists According to the Sources
Concerning the significance of the primary sources — concerning Greek philosophy in particular. —
This lecture will not be without significance for the problems that occupy our age. The category to which I intend to trace everything, and which is also the category lying dormant in Greek Sophistry if one views it world-historically, is motion (Κíνησις, which is perhaps one of the most difficult problems in philosophy. In modern philosophy it has been given another expression — namely, transition and mediation.
Addition to previous:
I will also go through each primary source book philologically. Among those I include: Plato's Theaetetus, Euthydemus, The Sophist, Gorgias, Protagoras — Aristotle's work on Protagoras and περì τϖν σοφιστικϖν ελεγχων. However, what is known of them from Sextus Empiricus, from Athenaeus, etc., is simply to be consulted and must not be presented directly.
Concerning the Concepts ESSE and INTER-ESSE
The different sciences ought to be ordered according to the different ways in which they accent being [Væren] and how the relationship to being provides reciprocal advantage.
|The certainty of these is absolute — here thought and being are one, but by the same token these sciences are hypothetical.|
|Existential science [Existentiel-Videnskab].|
Das Wesen als Grund der Existents
- Die reinen Reflexions Bestimmungen
(α) Identitæt (β) Unterschied (γ) Grund
- die Existents
- das Ding
- Die Welt der Erscheinung
- Inhalt und Form
- Das Verhaltniss
Some of the most difficult disputes are all the boundary disputes in the sciences — the boundary between jurisprudence and ethics; moral philosophy and dogmatics — psychology and moral philosophy, etc. Usually a single science is treated by itself; then one has much to say and gives no thought to the possibility of everything suddenly being dissolved if the presupposition must be altered. — This is especially true of esthetics, which has always been assiduously cultivated, but almost always in isolation. Many of the estheticians are poets. Aristotle is an exception. He easily perceives that it has a relation to rhetoric, ethics, and politics.
How does ideality become alive for the lyrical poets — the epic poet has the subject matter and the muse, for the lyrical poet the muse itself is the subject matter; the epic poet invokes the muse, the lyric poet is infatuated with the muse whether it is a happy love affair or not.
An observation in Apollonius of Tyana's Life of Philostratus, 2, 22 ff., pp. 258 ff. in translation. See also pp. 523 ff. "All poetry is imitation" (Aristotle) — "better or worse than we are." Hence poetry points beyond itself to actuality and to the metaphysical identity. — Where does the poetic center lie — As soon as it is directed toward sympathy — Therefore we cannot say that we sympathize with Christ. Scripture also says the opposite. See Hebrews 4.
The epical lies in continuity, the lyrical in discreteness. The originality of the epical is therefore different from that of the lyrical.
A remarkable definition of the beautiful:
See Aristotle, Ch. 7. Curtius remarks on this passage that Aristotle did not acknowledge that there are beautiful children. It presumably was not worth the trouble of finding out whether or not this was so. At the end he quotes book 4 of Aristotle's Ethics, but this is a very careless reference.*
In margin: * The passage is 4,7, where he speaks of μεγαλοπρεπεια and observes en passant:
On the theme of the comic significance of evil, comparison can be made with a passage in Leibniz's Theodicee, in which he refers to an English book which has conceived of hell as comic. See para. 270. (The English prelate he talks about presumably is King?)
The Plan for My Lectures
On the Concept of Poetry
The Movement through Esthetics
3. The Comic
Cultus des Genius